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   EVICTION COURT AND A JUDICIAL DUTY OF INQUIRY 
   Harold J. Krent*, Peter Cheun**, Kayla Higgins**, Matthew McElwee**,  
Alexandra McNicholas** 
 
In the recent Illinois Appellate Court decision in Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. King,1 the 
court remanded a landlord’s action for possession of an apartment in part on the ground that the 
tenant likely did not know that she had agreed to vacate the apartment when signing an order to 
resolve the court contest.  The tenant, who was not represented by an attorney, testified that she 
thought she had agreed to pay the past due by a date certain, but not that she agreed in addition to 
vacate the premises.2 The court noted that the tenant was unrepresented and that the judge had 
not asked her whether she knew she was being evicted under terms of the order, and therefore 
stated that “it is understandable that defendant was under the impression that she had agreed she 
could remain in the apartment by paying the amounts demanded.”3   
The scenario depicted in Draper & Kramer is all too prevalent.  Countless tenants, 
confused and pressured in court, sign orders presented to them by the landlord’s attorney that 
they may not understand require them to leave their homes.  Many judges routinely rubberstamp 
these consent agreements without a second look, as the eviction court judge apparently did in the 
Draper & Kramer case. 
The goal of this Essay is to persuade judges in eviction courts to take the one minute or 
so before entering an agreed upon order of Possession between landlords and unrepresented 
tenants to ensure that the tenants are fully aware that the agreed upon order terminates their 
                                                 
*Dean and Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
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1 Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. King, 2014 IL App (1st) 132073, ¶ 22, reh'g denied (Jan. 28, 2015). 
2 Id. at 2. 
3 Id. at 17-18. 
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rights to housing.  As in other contexts of the law such as in plea bargaining or the right to 
represent oneself in court, judges should ensure that parties before them are knowingly 
relinquishing a fundamental interest. 
Accordingly, in part I we briefly describe the eviction court process and the evidence that 
we have unearthed strongly suggesting that tenants too often  unwittingly agree to vacate their 
residences.  We then canvas the key reasons why the right to continued housing is so 
fundamental in this society.  In part II we turn our gaze to comparable areas in which courts, 
before enforcing waivers of rights, have ensured that the parties involved understand the 
consequences of their waivers.  We analogize to court enforcement of particular settlements in 
part III, in which courts have exercised independent authority to assure that the settlements are 
fair when parties are not represented adequately or not likely to understand the terms.  Finally, in 
part IV, we conclude that the costs of imposing a limited duty of inquiry on the courts, although 
not negligible, plainly are eclipsed by the profound benefits of ensuring that those involved 
understand that they have agreed to vacate their residences. 
I 
THE EVICTION PROCESS 
A. The Regulatory Scheme 
Chicago’s eviction process is relatively representative of that in the country at large.4  In 
order to prevent issues and risks associated with self-help, state courts offer somewhat expedited 
eviction procedures to allow landlords and property owners to repossess their property relatively 
quickly in the event of default.  The process begins with service of a termination notice from the 
landlord to the tenant and a period of time in which the tenant has an opportunity, if possible, to 
                                                 
4 For a more detailed overview of the Chicago eviction process, see No Time for Justice: A Study of 




cure the violation (usually non-payment of rent or a violation of other lease provisions).  If the 
tenant has not cured the violation within the applicable period of time, the landlord may then file 
suit to evict the tenant in the form of a single action (possession of premises only) or joint action 
(possession and rent owed).  The action will be scheduled for trial on the first court dates after 
the tenant has been served with a summons. 
The case is set for trial on the initial court date, which takes place within as little as seven 
days of service of summons unless the tenant requests a continuance—the eviction court usually 
will grant a seven-day continuance to permit the tenant an opportunity to obtain an attorney.  The 
eviction court may or may not honor a demand for a jury trial made after the first time up, unless 
the tenant is able to obtain an attorney who then files a jury demand.  At trial, the landlord must 
first establish his or her prima facie case: (1) the landlord has the right to possession; (2) the 
tenant has possession; (3) the tenant is in violation of the law or the lease agreement, or is 
otherwise unlawfully occupying the premises; (4) the landlord served the tenant with a valid 
termination notice; and (5) the amount of rent due (if a joint action).  The tenant then has an 
opportunity to present his or her defenses.  Many of the issues that a defendant raises are not 
legally valid defenses, including partial tender of rent, personal or financial hardship, application 
of the security deposit to cover delinquent rent, or full payment of rent after the “cure” period has 
expired.  If the landlord wins, the judge will issue an Order of Possession giving the tenant a 
specified period of time in which to vacate the premises.  The Order of Possession functions as 
an eviction order.  If the tenant does not comply, the landlord may file the order with the sheriff 
for physical eviction. 
In the time leading up to trial, the landlord and tenant may communicate with each other 
outside the supervision of the court, often in informal settings, to attempt to come to an 
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agreement that would obviate the need for a trial.  For instance, tenants often agree to pay back 
amounts due by a certain date, and they may, depending upon the circumstances, agree to vacate 
the premises by a certain date as well.  These typically are deemed agreed upon Orders of 
Possession.  Such agreements are usually presented for approval to the judge, who will then enter 
the agreement as an enforceable agreed order.  Under ideal circumstances, the agreed order is 
fair, equitable, and understood by both parties.  Those circumstances, however, are not always 
present as highlighted by the Illinois Appellate Court in Draper & Kramer.  Indeed, courts in 
other jurisdictions have addressed situations where tenants have unknowingly signed away key 
rights under the mistaken assumption that consenting to an agreed order is either required, 
customary, or would otherwise allow them to remain in their homes.5  Furthermore, some 
landlords will agree instead to a compliance order, requiring tenants to vacate by a certain date, 
which if abided by, obviates the need for an eviction per se.6  
B. The Problem of Agreed Upon Orders 
 Based upon our observations at Chicago’s eviction court as well on data compiled by the 
public interest organization CARPLS (Coordinated Advice and Reference Program for Legal 
Services), we are convinced that the situation highlighted in Draper & Kramer is not unique, at 
least in Chicago.  In the emotional and confusing atmosphere of eviction courts, unrepresented 
tenants may well sign away their rights to continued possession of their homes without realizing 
it.  Indeed, the very term “Order of Possession” may confuse tenants who do not realize that, by 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Cmty. Realty Mgmt., Inc. for Wrightstown Arms Apts. v. Harris, 714 A.2d 282 (N.J. 1998) 
(vacating an agreed order entered by an eviction court because a pro se tenant reasonably believed she 
was agreeing to repayment of rent and not her own eviction).  C.f. Vernon Assocs. v. Brown, No. CV 
990071363S, 2000 WL 670043 (Conn. Sup’r Ct. May 11, 2000) (denying landlord’s application for 
approval of attorney’s fees pursuant to a written stipulation signed by the landlord’s attorney and pro se 
tenant and approved by the trial court outside the presence of the parties without further explanation to the 
tenant). 




entering into an agreement to vacate the premises, an eviction will show up on their credit 
records.  
 Between October 2014 and April 2015, we observed 250 eviction court proceedings. 
These observations took place in 4 different courtrooms with 5 different judges across various 
times of day in Cook County. We planned the observation process to be consistent across 
different judges and observers.  Each of the four observers attended a different courtroom with a 
different judge each day of observation.  We developed a checkbox tally system to track whether 
the landlord’s attorney met with the tenant prior to appearing before the judge; whether the 
parties presented an independently agreed upon order before the judge; whether the judge asked 
meaningful questions of unrepresented tenants; and whether there were additional notes of 
interest unique to that observation.  Meaningful questions, in our terminology, included 
questions that ensured understanding of specific terms of the order but not generic confirmation 
that a tenant would respond to reflexively.  For example, the question “Do you understand that 
you’re agreed to be evicted from the resident” would qualify as a meaningful question, but “Is 
this your order”? was not so considered.  An agreed upon order was defined in our observations 
as an agreement reached by the tenant and landlord’s attorney to be presented to the judge for 
approval. 
We conducted the observations from the front row of the observation area in each 
courtroom.  We did not identify ourselves to the judges, attorneys or tenants so as not to 
influence behavior in any way.  We note that, although we conceived of the study prior to 
Draper & Kramer, all of the recorded observations came afterward.   
Sixty-three of hearings observed resulted in the entry of an order of Possession between 
tenant and landlord (25.2%). Of those 63 agreed orders, 46 were concluded on the day of the 
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hearing between landlord and tenant or, more frequently, between tenant and landlord’s counsel 
(73%). There is an area separated from each courtroom in which the parties can discuss their 
cases independently, so we were able to track when the landlord’s attorney concluded an 
agreement with an unrepresented tenant.  If a landlord’s attorney and unrepresented tenant 
discussed their case privately before appearing in front of the judge and then presented an agreed 
order to the judge, the observer noted this as a same-day agreed order.  In 40 of the observed 
agreed orders (63.5%), the judge engaged in some sort of explanation to or questioning of the 
tenant. However, the degree of questioning ranged broadly, from simply asking “Is this your 
order?” to a more comprehensive breakdown of each agreed term, with an explanation of what 
the terms meant.  Note that the data were collected after the Draper & Kramer decision, so we 
were surprised by the statistics. 
 Extrapolating, more than a quarter of all eviction cases in Cook County are resolved 
through the agreed-order process. Nearly 75% of agreed orders are put together and placed 
before a judge within minutes of the tenant meeting the landlord’s attorney, allowing for very 
little time to obtain counsel or carefully reason through a decision. And, judges explained the 
terms of the agreed orders in barely 60% percent of the cases and much of the explanations were 
conclusory.  
Yet, we noted that judicial inquiry in some cases yielded significant results. For example, 
a case was continued because a judge discovered that a Polish translator was needed because the 
tenant didn’t speak English. The continuance was ordered after an agreed order was presented to 
the judge for approval.  In another case, the landlord’s attorney was chastised by a judge when 
the agreed-order was unclear in its terms and the tenant did not understand them. The parties 
were sent to the end of the docket to clarify the order. One judge habitually outlined each 
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individual term to the tenant when an agreed order was placed in front of her, ensuring complete 
understanding each time. These anecdotal observations illustrate both the problem and the 
solution. Agreed orders at times are abused, but the abuse can be easily curbed.  
CARPLS is a legal aid service that uses a hotline and court-based Advice Desks to give 
immediate responses to everyday legal problems confronting low-income residents of Cook 
County. We asked CARPLS to record data for a span of eight months on tenant complaints 
arising from agreed eviction orders with their landlords.  The data collected bolstered what we 
witnessed in eviction court.  
 For example, CARPLS recorded that eleven tenants reported that they did not read the 
orders before signing them, and nineteen others reported that they did not understand the order 
they had signed.  Only four tenants in registering their complaints related that the judge had tried 
to explain the order.  Of course, evidence from the tenants can be self-serving in that some may 
have been desperate to find a way to stay in their residences.  Nonetheless, the data reported 
support our findings that many tenants do not understand the agreed orders that they sign, and 
only in the minority of cases do judges explain those orders to tenants before entering them.  
 The CARPLS data also reveal that the problem of agreed upon orders does not stem from 
just one or two problematic judges. The data show that several  different judges over that period 
of time failed to explain to tenants what the order they were agreeing to meant.  Many merely 
asked, “Is this your agreement?” or “Do you agree?” Overall, the data indicate that, when tenants 
sign away important rights, the judges do not make sure that they understand what they are 
giving up.7  Because the power dynamics in eviction court often lead tenants to feel pressured 
into signing orders drafted by landlords’ attorneys, the court’s role should be to make sure 
                                                 
7 The Director of Legal Services at CARPLS, Patricia Wrona, observed, “If I see a pattern, it is the client 
does not read the order, if they read, they do not comprehend, and the court is doing little to explain.”  
8 
 
tenants are knowingly and willingly entering into agreed orders before the court makes those 
agreements binding.  
C. Fundamental Interest in Housing  
Many believe that possession of a home is a basic human right.  The right of shelter is 
enshrined in our traditions, if not in the Constitution.  A residence is critical to privacy, safety, 
and health.  Those who are evicted not only may lose shelter but a neighborhood, school, and 
access to work.  Furthermore, tenants who are evicted often lose their possessions.8  Many other 
societies have elevated the right to one of constitutional or statutory order.9 
In addition to the interest in maintaining possession of their home, individuals also have 
an important interest in avoiding the penalties associated with having an eviction on their record. 
As Matthew Desmond, an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Social Studies at Harvard 
University, explains, “Evictions carry a stigma. Many landlords will not rent to persons who 
have been evicted, and an eviction can also ban a person from affordable housing programs.”10 
                                                 
8 Matthew Desmond & Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, Eviction’s Fallout: Housing, Hardship, and Health, 
SOCIAL FORCES (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5) (available at 
http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/recent) (Families who receive an eviction judgment are often 
ordered to vacate in a matter of days, and if the family is removed by sheriff deputies the family’s 
possessions are usually piled on the curb or confiscated by movers). 
9 Significantly, outside of the United States a right to adequate housing has been recognized in several 
international statements regarding human rights. For example, The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) explicitly recognizes the right to adequate housing, as does the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Housing rights are also protected within the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1989), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1959), and the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990). See 




10 Matthew Desmond, Poor Black Women Are Evicted at Alarming Rates, Setting Off A Chain of 




Just as the mark of a criminal record can negatively impact one’s success on the job market,11 the 
stigma of eviction can substantially influence one’s success on the housing market.12  
The economic straits of those evicted almost always worsen substantially.  Having an 
eviction on one’s record not only can prevent one from securing affordable housing in a decent 
neighborhood, it also can tarnish one’s credit rating.13 A court-ordered eviction, whether by 
agreement of both parties or not, can make a household ineligible for some forms of emergency 
shelter assistance.14 And recent research has demonstrated the likelihood of being laid off to be 
11 to 15 percentage points higher for people who experienced an eviction or other involuntary 
move compared to people who did not.15  
This increased likelihood of unemployment following an eviction could be due to the 
general disruption that evictions cause in peoples’ lives, but it could also be due specifically to 
the psychological effects of eviction. Indeed, previous research has shown that experiencing 
involuntary housing loss may result in “economic scarring” that has been linked to persistent 
depressive symptoms.16 
These problems are logically exacerbated when the persons being evicted are already one 
of America’s poorest demographic groups: low-income mothers.17 Indeed, among tenants who 
                                                 
11 See generally DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION (2007) 
12 James D. Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal 
Assistance: A Randomized Study in A Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 901, 914-15 (2013). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershenson, Housing and Employment Insecurity among the Working 
Poor (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard University).  
16 See generally William Gallo et al., The Persistence of Depressive Symptoms in Older Workers Who 
Experience Involuntary Job Loss: Results from the Health and Retirement Survey, 61 J. OF 
GERONTOLOGY, B: PSYCHOL. SCI. AND SOC. SCI. S221, S221-28 (2006) (Investigators in a variety of 
disciplines, but most notably economics, have studied the enduring effects of a significant life experience, 
referred to as “scarring.”). 
17 See Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5).  
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appear in eviction court, women and children are those most likely to receive an eviction 
judgment, even after accounting for differences in debt.18 Applying statistical analysis to a 
nationally representative and longitudinal data set, Desmond showed in a recent study that 
eviction negatively affects mothers in multiple ways.19 Compared to those not evicted, “mothers 
who were evicted in the previous year experienced more material hardship, were more likely to 
suffer from depression, reported worse health for themselves and their children, and reported 
more parenting stress.”20  
Desmond’s findings have revealed that black women are disproportionately evicted in a 
similar manner to how black men are disproportionately incarcerated. Comparing the devastating 
long-term consequences of an eviction record with those of a criminal record, Desmond quipped, 
“Poor black men are locked up while poor black women are locked out.”21 Desmond concluded 
from his research, which analyzed 29,960 eviction records in Milwaukee County from January 1, 
2003, to December 31, 2007 and included 251 on-site surveys at Milwaukee’s eviction court in 
January and February 2011, that “eviction is a cause, not just a condition, of poverty.”22 Eviction 
precipitates poverty because many who are evicted end up on the streets or in shelters.23 
Alternatively, if those who are evicted do find housing, their record of eviction means they are 
limited to decrepit units in unsafe neighborhoods.24  
The consequences of eviction are even more severe for those in federally-assisted 
housing programs.  In Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. King, the Illinois Appellate Court stressed that, 
                                                 
18 Matthew Desmond, Weihua An, Richelle Winkler & Thomas Ferriss, Evicting Children, 92 SOC. 
FORCES 303, 303-27 (2013). 
19 Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 8  (manuscript at 2). 
20 Id. 
21 Desmond, supra note 10. 
22 Elizabeth Gudrais, Disrupted Lives, HARV. MAG., http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/01/disrupted-lives 
(last visited June 14, 2015). 




if the agreed order between the tenant and the landlord’s counsel were carried out, the tenant 
would suffer a “severe penalty” as she would “lose her federal housing assistance and this would 
likely result in homelessness.”25 The Court stated that “[i]n light of the severity of the penalty 
that would result from affirming the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to vacate, we 
find that the relative hardships in this case favor defendant.”26   
 Accordingly, the emotional devastation of eviction is accompanied by lasting economic 
degradation.  Before a court enforces an order requiring eviction, it should take steps, if feasible, 
to ensure that the tenant understands that he or she has agreed to vacate. 
II 
JUDICIAL DUTY OF INQUIRY 
The law requires consent to be made freely, willingly and knowingly in important areas 
where the consequence of that choice implicates the surrender of fundamental liberty interests.27 
These areas include, but are not limited to, the waiver of certain constitutional rights in criminal 
trials, the waiver of parental rights in surrogacy and adoption agreements, and the requirement 
for assent to abortion or other surgical medical procedures. While some of these areas involve 
the relinquishment of Sixth Amendment rights and liberty interests that are of constitutional 
dimension, in other areas, such as family law, the practice of establishing knowing consent 
reflects more judicial custom than constitutional dictate.  
 A. Duty of Inquiry in Constitutional Criminal Procedure Context 
                                                 
25 Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. King, 2014 IL App (1st) 132073, ¶ 22 (Jan. 28, 2015). 
26 Id. at ¶ 33.  And, of course, many individuals enjoy a Due Process right to public housing, which 
independently would require adequate notice prior to eviction See, e.g., Johnson v. Illinois Dep’t of Pub. 
Aid, 467 F.2d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that tenancy in public housing cannot be terminated 
without affording the tenant adequate procedural safeguards). 
27 See e.g. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241 (1969). 
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Nowhere is the magnitude of establishing knowing consent more critical than in the 
circumstance of individuals agreeing to give up their liberty. In Boykin v. Alabama,28 the 
Supreme Court held that consent to a plea agreement must be willingly, intelligently, and 
knowingly given, and accordingly imposed a duty of inquiry upon courts to assure that the 
consequences of the plea were plainly understood.  In Boykin, an indigent defendant was accused 
of five counts of common-law robbery and pled guilty to all charges at his arraignment, and the 
penalty meted was death.29  Given that the death sentence in Alabama was automatically 
appealable, the appellate court inquired into whether the defendant’s plea of guilty, made silently 
and non-affirmatively, was sufficient to waive that defendant’s constitutional rights. A plea of 
guilty is not just a confession of guilt, in the eyes of the law it is a conviction and, at the 
appellate level, is treated as if a jury found the defendant guilty of the crime.30 Upon review, the 
appellate court determined that, because a plea of guilty implicates important constitutional 
rights -- including a waiver of privilege against self-incrimination, right to trial by jury and the 
right to confront one’s accusers -- the lower court’s acceptance of his waiver was “error, plain on 
the face of the record . . . to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it 
was intelligent and voluntary.”31  
Accordingly, judges must ensure that the record reflect that a defendant intelligently, 
knowingly, and willingly waived those rights. As a result, at both the federal and state levels, 
procedural protection for defendants entering pleas of guilty have been implemented, mandating 
                                                 
28 395 U.S. 238, 241 (1969). 
29 Id. at 239. 
30 See id. at 242. 
31 Id. at 242-43. 
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trial court judges to advise defendants of the rights they are giving up in what has been 
colloquially named a Boykin form.32  
The court’s duty of inquiry has expanded to other criminal procedure contexts.  Most 
notably, judges must ensure that criminal defendants who decline counsel understand the 
ramifications of their decision given that the right to counsel is so critically tied to the adversary 
system.  In recognizing a constitutional right to self-representation, the Supreme Court in Faretta 
v. California33 nevertheless stressed that a court typically must engage a criminal defendant in 
extended conversation about the process of a trial to ensure that his or her waiver of the right to 
an attorney is knowing and intelligent.  The Court explained that “[a]lthough a defendant need 
not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to 
choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he know what he is doing and his choice is 
made with eyes open.’”34  The Faretta inquiry is now routine.35 
B.  Duty of Inquiry Triggered by the Legislature 
Legislatures have imposed a judicial duty of inquiry in a wide variety of family law 
contexts.  For instance, judges must approve minors’ requests for an abortion if there is no 
parental consent.36  Thirty-six states have enacted laws imposing a duty on family law judges to 
                                                 
32 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (federal rule of criminal procedure governing the requirement of the court to 
inform and confirm the understanding of the defendant regarding the conditions of their plea and the 
relevant waiver of certain rights); see e.g. State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 260 La. 90, 103-04 (1971) 
(interpreting Boykin to require the court to establish, from the record, that the accused was informed of 
the waiver of constitutional rights and articulated that waiver).  
33 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
34 Id. at 837. 
35 See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 775 f.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. French, 748 F.3d 922 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
36 http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-info/abortion/parental-consent-notification-laws  
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ensure that the teens understand the gravity of the abortion decision and have good reason to 
bypass their parents’ consent, whether for fear of retribution or because of continual abuse. 
Adoption represents another area of family law where judges play a critical role to ensure 
informed consent. In all fifty states, the birth mother and father have the primary right to consent 
to adoption, with limited resort available to courts in extreme circumstances.37 The decision to 
adopt out a child is irrevocable in most circumstances.38 As a result, most states have 
implemented various judicially managed procedures to ensure that individuals do not make the 
decision hastily or rashly. This sort of regulated oversight may be paternalistic, but it is 
warranted when the right being waived is crucial.39  
Legislatures, therefore, at times have directed judges in the abortion and adoption contexts to 
ensure that individuals recognize the dramatic consequences of their actions.  Life changing 
decisions can only be taken after understanding some of the benefits and costs involved.   
In the criminal procedure context, as well, legislatures have imposed a duty of inquiry to 
make sure that waivers are knowing and voluntary, even when not required by the Constitution.  
Several states, including California and Connecticut, mandate that trial court judges advise 
certain defendants considering plea agreements of a potential deportation consequence so they 
may reconsider their plea.40 Legislatures thus have expanded the duty of inquiry to protect 
critical individual interests – in this context, the right to stay in the United States.   
 Legislatures have also imposed a judicial duty of inquiry in the immigration context to 
ensure that foreign nationals are not waiving statutorily granted relief that could protect them 
against removal from the United States.  For instance, individuals subject to removal proceedings 
                                                 
37 Supra note 36 at 2.  
38 Id. at 5.  
39 Id.  




for overstaying their visas or lying on immigration documents may choose, as an alternative to 
the removal proceedings, to leave the country voluntarily without going through the 
proceedings.41  Such a result could be attractive to the foreign national since he or she could 
avoid the consequences of forced removal, such as a future bar from admission to the United 
States.42  On the other hand, a voluntary departure deprives the foreign national of a complete 
hearing that could result in relief from removal.43  Accepting voluntary departure has the effect 
of waiving as well any subsequent appellate rights, including an administrative appeal to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals and judicial review thereafter. 
Individuals may seek judicial review of an order of removal by an immigration judge.44  
A waiver of a foreign national’s appellate rights of an immigration proceeding must be 
knowingly and intelligently made.45  There is statutory basis for an immigration judge’s 
responsibility to ensure that a removable foreign national is notified of his appellate rights.46     
In Narine, the Ninth Circuit held that an immigration judge’s duty to inquire requires 
more than a mere question as to whether an unrepresented foreign national accepted a voluntary 
departure decision as final.  Rather, the IJ had to ensure that the unrepresented foreign national 
knew the consequences that flow from removal, i.e., precluding the right of return.47  During the 
removal hearing, without counsel present, Narine moved for voluntary departure.  The following 
colloquy between the IJ and Narine ensued: 
                                                 
41 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012) (listing the conditions for a grant of voluntary departure).   
42 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9).   
43 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (cancellation of removal and adjustment of status). 
44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (judicial review of orders of removal).   
45 Narine v. Holder, 559 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 
(1987)).   
46 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5) (“If the immigration judge decides that the alien is removable and orders the 
alien to be removed, the judge shall inform the alien of the right to appeal that decision and of the 
consequences for failure to depart under the order of removal, including civil and criminal penalties.”). 
47 Narine, 559 F.3d at 250. 
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“Q: Mr. Narine, did you intend to leave the United States? 
“A: Yes. 
“Q: Okay.  And, this is the only request that you’re making on the court, right? 
“A: Yes, Your Honor. 
“Q: And, if I grant voluntary departure today, do you intend this as the final decision in 
your case today? 
“A: No. 
“Q: If you say no, then you’re not eligible for voluntary departure and this stays at the 
proceeding.  My question to be clear is if I sign an order that says you can leave voluntarily do 
you agree that this is the end of this court case? 
“A: Yes.”48 
The Ninth Circuit’s finding that the waiver was not knowing or intelligent had two 
dimensions.  First, because Narine was not represented by counsel at the time and there was 
nothing in the record to show that her previous attorney had fully explained the right of appeal, it 
was the IJ’s responsibility to “explicitly advise the [foreign national] that he or she must waive 
the right to appeal in order to be granted this form of voluntary departure.”49 Moreover, “given 
the regulatory requirement that the right to appeal be waived and the due process implications of 
construing an ‘implicit’ waiver of the right to appeal, as well as the jurisdictional implications of 
a waiver itself, [it is] critical that the record must clearly demonstrate that the right of appeal was 
actually, and not merely constructively, waived by the alien.”50   
Second, because she was an unsophisticated party, Narine did not demonstrate a “clear 
understanding of the consequences of accepting voluntary departure” by responding 
                                                 
48 Id. at 248. 
49 Id. at 249 (quoting In re Cordova, 22 I. & N. Dec. 966, 971 (B.I.A. 1999)). 
50 Narine, 559 F.3d at 250 (quoting In re Ocampo-Ugalde, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1301, 1304 (B.I.A. 2000)). 
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affirmatively when the IJ asked if she agreed that her decision was final. While “the precise 
articulation of appeal rights required in any given case will necessarily depend on the 
circumstances of that case,” where a foreign national is unrepresented, the need for an explicit 
explanation of a waiver of appeal rights is “especially important.”51  The Ninth Circuit, therefore, 
expanded the colloquy required by statute. 
Thus, judges in part on their own volition in the immigration context have imposed a duty 
of inquiry upon Immigration Judges to ensure that the consequences of a voluntary return are 
understood.  When the rights at stake are high and the burden from inquiry limited, judges should 
ascertain whether the parties involved recognize the magnitude of the decision at stake and yet 
intend to waive their rights.  Such duty can spring from the Constitution, the legislature, or from 
judges’ need to ensure that fundamental rights waived in their presence be freely and knowingly 
                                                 
51 Id. at 251. The Narine  court further explained that 
[a]sking the parties whether they accept a decision as ‘final’ is a 
shorthand expression commonly used by Immigration Judges . . . .  
Those who understand the meaning of this shorthand expression, such as 
aliens represented by attorneys or accredited representatives, may 
effectively waive appeal in response to this simple question.  However, 
the meaning and significance of this shorthand expression may not be 
apparent to the unrepresented alien.  Asking an unrepresented alien 
whether he or she accepts a decision as ‘final’ does not necessarily alert 
the alien to the fact that the question concerns the right of appeal or that 
an affirmative answer will be construed as an irrevocable waiver of that 
right. 
Narine, 559 F.3d at 250-51 (quoting Rodriguez-Diaz, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1322).  See also Biwot v. 
Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a foreign national’s waiver of the right to 
appeal was not considered and intelligent where the foreign national said, “Your Honor, I accept the 
decision as final because I cannot do anything right now,” because the foreign national was under the 
misapprehension that he had no choice but to waive his appeal and he did not have counsel to disabuse 




relinquished.  Indeed, two judges on the D.C. Circuit recently stressed that “the practical benefits 
of an on-the-record colloquy are not limited to the criminal setting.”52  
III 
DUTY TO ASSESS FAIRNESS OF SETTLEMENTS 
Although private parties are free to settle their disputes in whatever way they deem 
appropriate, federal courts in a number of contexts have exercised an independent duty to assess 
the fairness of settlements, principally to protect the interests of parties not directly involved in 
the litigation.  From class actions53 to bankruptcy54 courts have assumed the responsibility to 
consider the fairness of settlements.55  And, they routinely scrutinize settlements involving the 
rights of minors to protect their rights.56  Just as in the plea bargain context, judges question 
parties to ensure that they fully comprehend the terms in the settlements. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 serves as an exemplar.  The rule specifies that 
settlement is to be upon “the court’s approval.”57  Courts therefore ensure that the settlements 
agreed to protect the interest of the absent members of the class.58  Given that there is no 
practical way for members of the class to participate in the settlement negotiations, and given 
that members of large class actions are not even likely to know about the lawsuit, judicial 
scrutiny is essential to maintain the fairness of the process.  Indeed, the interests of named parties, 
                                                 
52 United States v. Gewin, 759 F.3d 72, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Brown and Pillard, concurring) (addressing 
judicial duty of inquiry in civil contempt case). 
53 See infra text accompanying notes 57-58. 
54 See infra text accompanying notes 59-60. 
55 See generally Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of private mass Tort Settlements, 42 Seton Hall L. 
Rev. 123 (2012); Sanford J. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees:  An 
Economic Analysis, 28 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1999). 
56 See infra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
57 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23e. 




absent parties, and the class attorneys may well diverge, making the case for judicial scrutiny 
that much stronger. 
Similarly, Rule 9010(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides for 
judicial oversight of contested matters within the bankruptcy estate.59    Each claim may be 
resolved at the expense of another creditor or creditor class, so oversight is critical to ensure that 
the Trustee in Bankruptcy is proceeding fairly.60  As in the class action context, judicial 
supervision of settlements upholds the integrity of the process because not all those affected by 
the settlement have a direct say in its terms. 
Review of agreed orders in eviction cases would reflect one critical difference.  In the 
eviction context, the concern is not so much for an absent party, but rather that the private party 
does not understand the terms of the settlement.  Nonetheless, the class action and bankruptcy 
contexts readily demonstrate that courts routinely consider the fairness of settlements when 
sufficient concern for the process exists.  And, courts have assumed that obligation even when 
not required under the rules.61 
Moreover, in settlements involving the rights of minors, courts play an active role to 
ensure that the guardian has represented the rights of the minor sufficiently.  Because the minor 
cannot be expected to understand fully issues explicated in the settlement, courts assess the 
proposed terms of any agreement to protect the minor’s rights.  In Cook County, for instance, 
Rule 12.15(b)(1) directs judges to ensure that settlements in personal injury cases involving 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., In re Holly Marine Towing, 669 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2012); Chira v. Saal, 567 F.3d 1307 (11th 
Cir. 2009). 
60 See, e.g., In re Levine, 287 B.R. 683, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2002) (“The purpose of Rule 1019(a) is 
simply to give the trustee the opportunity to secure from the court a declaration that her decision to enter 
into a settlement was consistent with her duties as a fiduciary.”). 
61 See generally Note, Alexandra N. Rothman, Bringing an End to the Trend:  Cutting Judgment 
‘Approval’ and ‘Rejection’ Out of Non-class Mass Settlements, 80 Ford. L. Rev. 319 (2012) (critiquing 
judicial trend to scrutinize settlement in non-class cases). 
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minors are fair.  More generally, in Illinois “the court has a duty and broad discretion to protect 
the minors, interests.  That duty to protect . . .  requires that the court approve or reject any 
settlement agreement proposed on behalf of a minor.”62   
Judges protect the rights of minors at times because of legislative command but at other 
times through their inherent authority.  As a federal district court judge in Pennsylvania court 
noted, judges have the “inherent duty to protect the interest of minors . . . before [them].”63  That 
judge’s views are not aberrant.  The Alabama court asserted in Large v. Hayes64 that “[t]his 
Court has recognized the special nature of an attempted settlement of a minor’s claim.  Before 
such a settlement can be approved, there must be a hearing, with an extensive examination of the 
facts, to determine whether the settlement is in the best interest of the minor.”  A judicial duty of 
inquiry in the eviction process thus would be consistent with the tradition of judicial examination 
of settlements where there is special reason, by virtue of absent parties or parties who may not 
fully understand the terms, to assure that the interests of all the parties affected are being fairly 
protected. 
IV 
THE DUTY OF INQUIRY IN THE EVICTION CONTEXT 
 No clear bound aries demarcate when a judicial duty of inquiry should be triggered, 
absent constitutional or legislative command.  Nonetheless, some common determinants arise 
from the contexts previously canvassed.   
First, the rights at stake must be fundamental.  The plea bargain decision, the right to stay 
in this country, and questions of family integrity are all critical and have been viewed so for 
generations.  Similarly, the right to housing is fundamental for all the reasons previously 
                                                 
62 Wreglesworth v. Arctco, 738 N.E.2d 964 (Ill. App. 2000). 
63 Keith ex rel. Eagan v. Jackson, 855 F. Supp. 765, 775 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
64 534 So. 2d 1101, 1105 (Ala. 1988). 
21 
 
discussed.  Issues of dignity, health, safety and basic economics all turn on maintaining a roof 
over our heads. 
Second, there must be an appreciable risk that the parties did not intend to waive their 
rights or will not realize the consequences attendant upon pursuing a course of action.  Foreign 
nationals may not appreciate the impact of voluntary departure, criminal defendants may not 
appreciate the consequences of self-representation, and minors cannot be expected to understand 
their rights fully.  Similarly, in the eviction process, our study has convinced us that too many 
tenants do not realize that they have relinquished their right to stay in their premises when 
entering an agreed order to pay their landlords arrears. 
Finally, in most of the contexts, the judicial duty of inquiry is brief and imposes only 
modest burdens upon the court.  Indeed, inquiring whether a party intended to waive a right 
should be less demanding than ascertaining whether a party fully understands the consequences 
of the waiver, as in the Faretta context.  And, the duty of inquiry proposed is far less 
comprehensive than a judicial duty to consider the fairness of a class action settlement.  To be 
sure, the eviction hearing typically is far shorter than a hearing to approve a plea bargaining or to 
approve bypassing parental consent for an abortion.  The entire hearing may last a couple of 
minutes.  Yet, the duty of inquiry should impose no more than a minute of additional time – if 
that -- and we in fact witnessed judges who made the inquiry quickly and efficiently.   
For instance, as part of opening announcements in the courtroom, the presiding judge 
might announce:  “If you have reached an agreement that resolves all the issues in your case, and 
if you do not have an attorney, I will enter the agreement only after I have confirmed that you 
understand its terms.  If the agreement awards your landlord possession of the premises, this 
means that the landlord will have the right to evict you.  The landlord may still decide to let you 
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stay, but does not have to.  Therefore, if you want to enter an agreed order that allows you to stay 
in your apartment after you pay everything you owe by a certain date, you must make sure that 
there is a provision in the agreement allowing you continuing possession.”   
Thereafter, as each settlement for an Order of Possession is presented for approval, the 
judge can scan the agreement to ensure that tenants understand, where applicable, that 1) they 
have agreed to vacate the premises; 2) that, despite the agreement, an eviction will appear in the 
court records.  If the tenant then reconsiders, the judge should inform him or her again of the 
right to an attorney and the option, if the landlord agrees, to sign a compliance order instead.  
Under the compliance order, the tenant would agree to vacate the premises by a certain date, 
which would obviate the need for a recorded eviction.  This quick checklist approach is 
appropriate in light of the dramatic consequences at stake to ensure that pro se litigants 
understand the ramification of an order of possession.  
 The duty of inquiry accordingly can be brief.  Judges should have the responsibility to 
determine whether the tenants’ agreements to give up the premises are understood.  Moreover, 
requiring the inquiry will avoid future appeals as in Draper & Kramer and thus may end up 
saving judicial resources overall.65  On balance, inquiring whether an unrepresented tenant 
understands the terms of agreed-upon orders comports with many examples in our jurisprudence 





                                                 
65 See also Gewin, supra note 52, at 90 (noting that the burden of a colloquy is offset by avoidance of 





In the tumultuous and emotionally charged atmosphere of eviction court, tenants too 
often agree to orders presented by their landlords’ attorney without appreciating that they have 
committed to leaving their residence in addition to paying arrears.  In light of the importance of 
housing in itself and also as it protects health and education, courts should take the step of 
ensuring that the tenants understand what is in the agreement.  The judge’s duty of inquiry can be 
limited but is essential to ensuring that the court not become an unwitting tool of needless 
suffering. 
 
